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In assessing the governance capacities and areas of weakness of the
Palestinian state, we have to remember that we are evaluating a developing-
country state that potentially shared all the challenges of economic
development faced by other developing country states. But moreover, the
‘quasi-state’ that was set up in 1994 to administer parts of the occupied
Palestinian territories lacked most of the powers of a conventional devel-
oping country state. Apart from lacking control over borders or possessing
contiguous territory, the PNA also lacked an adequate fiscal base and was
dependent on tax remittances of customs and income taxes collected by
Israel from Palestinians. Its trade relationships with the outside world were
dependent on Israel with which it remained in a customs union. Its
economic survival therefore depended on transfers from Israel of taxes
collected from Palestinians and on aid from donors. The movements of
goods and people to the outside world and even within its own territories
had to go through multiple Israeli controlled checkpoints that could be
opened or closed depending on the satisfactory performance of the PNA
from the Israeli perspective of delivering security (see Chapter 3 by Zagha
and Zomlot, pp. 000–00). On the Palestinian side, Oslo and the subsequent
accords were premised on a huge gamble by the PLO, and later by the PNA.
Their leadership hoped that rapid progress could be achieved, based on
these agreements, to lead to a sovereign Palestinian state on the entire occu-
pied WBG (including East Jerusalem), that a just solution to the question of
Palestinian refugees would be found, and that there would be rapid
economic progress under Palestinian sovereignty. Only then would it be able
to undercut support for rejectionist political positions within the Palestinian
community and guarantee its own political survival.
State formation under these conditions required a high degree of execu-
tive centralization. This was widely recognized and built into the governance
architecture created for the PNA under the Oslo Agreements. Much of the
observed maladministration and some of the evidence of corruption flowed
directly from the construction of this architecture. It is important to
remember that this architecture was essential for the ‘security-first’ route
that Israel insisted on, and nothing else was on offer to the Palestinians in





their attempt to construct a two-state solution. Nevertheless, the Palestinian
president operating this centralized system enjoyed widespread legitimacy
within the WBG Palestinian constituency. This offered a unique historical
opportunity to make painful decisions provided clear achievements towards
rapid statehood could be demonstrated to the Palestinian public. But in fact,
progress on this route came to a grinding halt with the outbreak of the
Second Intifada following the breakdown of final status negotiations at
Camp David in July 2000. As the Intifada advanced and Israeli military and
political reactions intensified, the project that motivated the establishment of
the PNA became increasingly vulnerable. Inevitably, the Intifada and Israeli
reactions to it will lead to a fundamental re-thinking of strategies on both
sides, and what may have been possible in the Oslo phase may not be
possible later on. In any case, the causes behind this dramatic reversal have
to be properly understood, even if only to identify more accurately the
hurdles on the way.
Table 1.1 gives a picture of the economic performance of the Palestinian
territories during this period. Clearly, the period in question was very short
and the data has a margin of error. But it is good enough to indicate the
broad outlines of economic performance. Compared to other middle-
income developing countries, economic growth in the Palestinian territories
was remarkably high before the blockade that was imposed on the economy
after the beginning of the Second Intifada in 2000. These high growth rates,
and the high investment rates sustaining them, are particularly remarkable
given the great uncertainty about the future of the territories. Immediately
after the creation of the PNA in 1994, growth rates were low, partly because
of administrative disruptions but largely because Israel immediately set
about establishing internal borders and checkpoints to control Palestinian
population movements and the transit of goods. However, by 1997 real gross
domestic product (GDP) growth became strongly positive. By this time, the
PNA had established much of its administrative apparatus. Moreover, by
then Israel had also set up its checkpoints and internal borders, and it began
to allow more Palestinian labour movements, but now with the possibility of
shutting off entire Palestinian areas not only from Israel but also from each
other at very short notice. Private investments in the Palestinian territories
also picked up sharply after 1997, indicating that the PNA had acquired the
capacity and credibility to induce expatriate Palestinians to begin investing
in the territories. The share of industry, broadly defined, remained constant
at around 20 per cent of GDP over 1994–2000. Given the rapid growth of
GDP during this period, this indicates that growth rates for industry were
just as high.
Throughout this period, the Palestinian territories remained heavily aid
dependent, with 18 per cent of GDP coming from aid in 1994. However, as
GDP grew, the share of aid declined sharply to around 10 per cent of GDP
by the end of the period, and this possibly explains the decline in public
investment over this period, which was heavily financed by aid.1 In 1999, the
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per capita GDP (at current prices) for WBG (excluding East Jerusalem) was
estimated at $1,641 ($1,851 for the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem and
$1,339 for the Gaza Strip).2 Clearly there were serious economic problems
but Palestine was potentially not the typical basket-case economy that often
emerges out of long-running conflict situations. In particular, the evidence
on private investment and GDP growth, once the administration had stabi-
lized, are not unimpressive for a high-conflict zone. Service-delivery by the
authority in key areas of health and education had its critics and suffered
from resource scarcities, but performance was comparable to or better than
in countries at similar levels of development (as assessed by a task force
commissioned by the US Council on Foreign Relations 1999: 5). All of these
achievements, however limited, came to an abrupt halt in 2000. The Israeli
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Table 1.1: The economy of the Palestinian territories 1994 2002 
  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 2002 
        (est)  (est) 
Real GDP 
growth rate  
8.5  6.1  2.5  12.2  11.8  8.9  -5.4  -15.0  -14.5 
Real GNI 
growth rate  
0.9  8.5  0.8  12.4  16.3  8.4  -6.8  -16.2  -16.4 
Share of 
industry in 
GDP (%)  
21.8  21.7  19.8  19.9  20.0  19.1  20.7  na  na 
Share of private 
fixed investment 
in GDP (%)  
26.5  21.8  26.3  25.3  26.4  31.7  25.0  20.1  16.6 
Share of public 
fixed investment 
in GDP (%)  
6.6  9.5  6.6  6.5  6.4  7.0  5.4  6.1  3.5 
Aid as 
proportion of 
GDP (%)  
18  17.6  15  14  10  11  12  na  na 
Unemployment 
rate  





The difference between gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national income
(GNI) is that the latter includes the income of Palestinians working in other coun-
tries, in particular, Israel. Industry includes mining, manufacturing, electricity, water
and public enterprises. Figures not available are reported as 'na'.
Source: IMF (2003): 20-25 (for recent estimates of disbursed aid), Tables 2.1, 2.2, 24; Valdivieso
et al. (2001): Table 1.1, World Bank (2000, 2001).
control over the borders of non-contiguous Palestinian enclaves and many
of their inner roads explains the massive and immediate impact of Israeli
closure measures following the Second Intifada. The subsequent years mark
a clear break with the previous period. The administrative structure of the
PNA was seriously degraded, with direct attacks on its physical infrastruc-
ture. Not surprisingly, the private investments that had buoyed the economy
also collapsed as the territories were closed off.
Even when the economy was rapidly growing in the late 1990s, there were
many observations of internal maladministration, petty and not-so-petty
corruption, and very slow progress in the deepening of democracy.
Questions began to be asked about the institutional and governance reforms
that had to be addressed if the PNA was to achieve better economic perfor-
mance and greater political viability. The good governance approach is one
of a number of approaches that try to answer this question by comparing
developing country states with an abstract model of a liberal democratic
state as it is supposed to work in an advanced capitalist economy. The
observed differences between actual governance and theoretical good gover-
nance are used to explain backwardness or poor economic performance in
the developing country. While the good governance model is based on neo-
liberal political and economic theory, its conclusions and criticisms have
gained wide currency because these appear to be supported by other analyt-
ical methodologies as well. The neo-patrimonial model, based on extensions
of Weberian sociology, reaches similar policy conclusions about the impor-
tance of democracy and corruption. Both approaches provide a ready-made
critique of what went wrong in the PNA. Since evidence of corruption,
monopolies, centralized power, and slow progress towards democratization
could be readily found within the PNA, the good governance and neo-patri-
monial models suggest that these factors played an important role in
impeding Palestinian progress towards viable statehood.
There are two fundamental problems with the good governance and
related neo-patrimonial approaches. First, at a general level, the causality
implied in these models, running from anti-corruption, democracy and liber-
alization to economic prosperity, is contrary to a significant body of
historical evidence (Khan 2004, 2002b). The theory and evidence underpin-
ning the good governance model and our alternative framework for
assessing the role of the state during processes of social transformation are
discussed in the next two sections. The social transformation framework
suggests that there can be no disagreement about the desirability of democ-
racy or a corruption-free society as goals, there is considerable doubt about
whether policy to push either agenda as a means of accelerating develop-
ment is likely to be effective in the typical developmental context. It is not
even clear that these reforms can be implemented at all in the absence of
transformation being accelerated through appropriate policies.
A second problem with any attempt to apply the good governance frame-
works in the Palestinian context is that the PNA was a unique type of
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quasi-state that lacked almost all the powers and territorial sovereignty of a
normal state. The expectation that it should achieve democracy and good
governance before it had achieved statehood is even more implausible as a
demand. Moreover, even the limited powers that it had under the Oslo
Agreements included deliberately designed anti-democratic features and
structures that created incentives for corruption. These characteristics were
the result of the peculiar economic and security concerns of Israel that the
Oslo framework was trying to operate within. It is important to remember
that the Oslo Agreements allowed Israel to maintain its settlements and
extend controls over the movement of goods and people within the
Palestinian territories and between the territories and Israel without giving
the PNA almost any of the powers of a sovereign state. The PNA did not
control a contiguous territory, it had almost no fiscal autonomy, and it did
not control its own borders, including internal borders between enclaves.
These arrangements made executive centralization and corruption not just
possible but almost inevitable if the ‘state’ was to operate at all, and in the
early years, Israel and the external sponsors of the peace process partici-
pated heavily in setting up these structures. As Joseph Saba, the former head
of the World Bank’s West Bank and Gaza division put it: ‘You set up gates,
and you set up gatekeepers on each side of the gate, and history tells us that
gatekeepers charge tolls’ (Lagerquist 2003: 26). Palestinian traders had to set
up elaborate systems of influence and often of bribery involving Israeli
customs and other officials simply to be able to trade on a day-to-day basis.
Similarly, Oslo quite deliberately set up strong executive and security institu-
tions in the PNA to push through a peace process that was likely to face
strong, often violent, internal dissent within the Palestinian territories. This
too is not surprising when we recognize the enormous historic compromise
the Palestinians were asked to make by giving up all claims on 78 per cent of
historic Palestine in exchange for an uncertain promise to get an unknown
fraction of the remainder. And during this interim period, there were no
promises about the eventual status of Jerusalem, of refugees, or the degree
of sovereignty that was eventually going to be achieved.
An application of abstract good governance criteria to judge the
emerging Palestinian state is therefore doubly misleading and can give a seri-
ously distorted impression of what went wrong on the way to statehood. In
contrast to the good governance and neo-patrimonial approaches, the social
transformation perspective argues that confusing means with ends is
dangerous, particularly in conflict situations and in situations like that in
Palestine where the ‘state’ faced powerful externally determined institu-
tional, political and economic constraints. In these contexts, it is important
to focus instead on identifying and developing the state capacities that are
required to achieve a rapid transformation of society in the direction of
greater economic and political viability. A naïve good governance or neo-
patrimonial approach may be misleading or worse. They may be misleading
if they lead policy-makers to believe that attempts to tackle in a general way
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problems of corruption and democracy would have yielded, or will yield in
the future, the economic and political results that are desired. But they may
be worse if intentionally or otherwise they write off a state-building exercise
that may actually have worked, and which failed for reasons that interna-
tional policy-makers have no desire or ability to address.
The first section of this chapter discusses the thinking behind the good
governance agenda with its roots in neoclassical economics and liberal poli-
tics, and the related neo-patrimonial model, which reaches similar policy
conclusions from a neo-Weberian perspective. In the second section, we
examine an alternative framework for looking at the role of the state during
processes of social transformation. This approach focuses on the importance
of different types of ‘rents’. It argues that while some rents are damaging,
others are critical for accelerating development and maintaining political
stability. In this alternative approach, the importance of analysing corrup-
tion and rent-seeking is to identify critical areas where state capacity has to
be improved with the aim of accelerating a viable and developmental social
transformation. In the third section, we discuss the Palestinian evidence on
rents and rent-seeking in the context of our framework and identify the
major types of rents and rent-seeking that were in evidence over this period.
In the fourth section, we argue that these rents were consistent with a
number of different incipient state capacities and characteristics. Since the
viability of the Palestinian quasi-state was initially subject to Israeli control
through fiscal, trade and other mechanisms, we describe these rent-manage-
ment arrangements as a client state. We then argue that within this client
state, a number of contrary state characteristics and capacities were observ-
able in incipient form. These included some predatory characteristics, some
characteristics of a fragmented clientelist state, and some developmental
characteristics. In the final section, we discuss the methodology that we will
use in the rest of the book for analysing the likelihood of these different
outcomes materializing, and the conditions under which this might happen.
The liberal state as a benchmark for reform
To arrive at an appropriate theoretical framework for assessing the Palestinian
quasi-state, we will first critically examine the appropriateness of the good
governance framework applied to developing countries, and in particular to
Palestine. In this section, we examine in turn the good governance framework
and the related neo-patrimonial framework, before discussing our alternative
framework in the next section.
The good governance framework
The good governance agenda emerged out of a confluence of neoclassical
free-market economics and the ‘new’ political economy. It established a set
of plausible and apparently policy-relevant interconnections between
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democracy, anti-corruption policies and the establishment of a free-market
economy from which prosperity is supposed to follow. These relationships
are summarized in Figure 1.1. The first and most critical claim in the good
governance model comes from neoclassical economics that argues that the
achievement of economic prosperity requires a competitive market
economy, defined by free entry and exit. This is shown in step (i) of the good
governance argument in Figure 1.1. The underlying logic is that if the
market is competitive, only those who can satisfy consumer demand at the
lowest cost can survive, and this ensures that welfare is maximized. To main-
tain competition, the role of the state is only to protect property rights,
maintain free-markets, and provide a small number of essential public goods
that cannot be efficiently provided by the private sector. The way to check
whether a state is maintaining competitive markets is to see if it allows any
‘rents’ to exist in the economy. Individuals or firms earn rents if they can earn
a higher return in a specific activity than they could in their next-best opportu-
nity. In liberal economic theory, excess incomes would never exist in the
absence of some political intervention in the market. So, a commonsensical
definition of a rent is that it is a politically generated income, which would
not exist without some specific rights, subsidies or transfers that were artifi-
cially maintained through a political process. Monopoly profits, subsidies,
transfers, unnecessary job creation in the public sector are all examples of
rent-creation. Conversely, the theory says that the absence of rents means
that the market is fully competitive and this ensures the maximization of
prosperity and therefore of social welfare (see Khan 2000a for a detailed
analysis of rents).
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Figure 1.1 State failure in the good governance framework
A wide variety of state interventions can create these damaging types of
rents. For instance, states can give monopoly rights to favoured companies
to import particular products. They can prevent competition over the award
of public construction contracts, thereby creating monopoly rents for
favoured contractors. They can subsidize inefficient industries, creating rents
for them through transfers. They can create artificial jobs for favoured
groups; another case of transfer rents. In the simplest case, the state can
transfer resources legally or illegally to unproductive groups, creating rents
for these recipients. In each of these cases of damaging rents, the state-
created rent lowers economic efficiency as measured by a lower net output
for society as a whole. Moreover, to create these rents, states have to create
new property rights, disrupt existing property rights or transfer property
rights. Disrupting property rights further lowers incentives to invest in that
society. The first principle of the good governance agenda is therefore that
states should protect rent-free competitive markets, and by extension, stable
property rights.
The second step in the good governance model is to explain why, if rents
are so damaging for the economy, states persistently create them. The expla-
nation provided is that individuals who want to benefit from rents drive the
rent-creation. They spend resources to ‘influence’ or ‘capture’ the state and
this activity creates rents. Rent-seeking is the expenditure of resources to
influence or capture the state in order to acquire or retain rents. This is step
(ii) in Figure 1.1. While rent-seeking creates rents, rent-seeking is in turn
more likely if rents already exist and more can be created. As a result, there
is a two-way relationship between (i) and (ii): rents and rent-seeking rein-
force each other. Corruption is illegal rent-seeking, where the rent-seeker
breaks the law by bribing a public official to get a benefit that is by defini-
tion a rent. But much rent-seeking consists of legal activities that aim to
influence public officials for the benefit of the rent-seeker.
Legal rent-seeking includes expenditures on lobbying, legal contributions
to political parties, the time spent on these activities, and so on. These are
clearly an important part of any legitimate political process, but in economic
terms, legal rent-seeking has the same costs as any other type of rent-
seeking. Illegal rent-seeking includes corruption of different types.
Corruption is an illegal exchange between a public official and an individual
or firm, where in exchange for a bribe, a public official provides a benefit not
otherwise available to the briber (by definition a rent). Corruption includes
the bribing of public officials, illegal funding of parties and political move-
ments, and other illegal forms of influencing activity. The bribe is the
rent-seeking expenditure, which if successful, ‘buys’ rents of different types.
Outright expropriation or extortion can also be classified as a variant of
illegal rent-seeking. Here a public official threatens to create illegal rents for
himself or a client (extortion is essentially an illegal transfer) and to achieve
or stop this, the official and/or the affected individuals spend resources on
rent-seeking. The official spends resources to achieve coercive power to
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capture the illegal rent while affected individuals spend resources to restrict
this power or to bribe the official to take less.
Finally, there is a grey area of quasi-legal rent-seeking, which may not be
formally illegal, but which is not legally sanctioned either. Examples of this
type of rent-seeking in developing countries include the use of traditional
and personalized sources of power and influence. These often work through
patron–client networks that give well-connected individuals privileged access
to the state and to its resources. To maintain their power to influence the
state and capture rents, patrons spend resources to maintain their networks.
This includes providing resources for clients in times of need, finding them
jobs, and so on. The cost of doing this is the rent-seeking cost for the
patron, and this allows the patron to maintain his political power based on
his clients, and use this to bargain with the state for more rents. Although
there are clear economic similarities, there are clearly moral and political
differences between legal and illegal rent-seeking, since unchecked corrup-
tion can over time destroy the legitimacy of a state. But even these
differences are ones of degree, since legal rent-seeking can also be immoral
in its privileging of some groups, and too much of it can easily damage the
political legitimacy of the state.
In the good governance framework, the effects of all types of rent-
seeking are always negative because rent-seeking has a two-fold negative
effect summarized in Figure 1.2. First, rent-seeking expenditures (whether
legal, lobbying type expenditures or illegal corruption and bribery) are
always a social cost because these are unproductive expenditures. This is
shown in the arrow marked A in Figure 1.2. Second, in return for these
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Figure 1.2 The effects of rent-seeking in liberal market models
expenditures, the state creates rents for rent-seekers, shown by the arrow
marked B in Figure 1.2. These rents have additional negative effects on the
economy because rents are also damaging for the economy, according to
liberal market economics. Thus, because both sides of the exchange in
Figure 1.2, A and B, are negative for society, A  B adds up to a significant
negative effect (or cost). This is the outcome of all rent-seeking, which
includes corruption, lobbying and other forms. This analysis of rent-seeking
was developed in a series of articles beginning with Krueger (1974), Posner
(1975), Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980) and Colander (1984). The
subsequent literature on corruption was heavily influenced by this analysis.
For a critical survey of the literature on corruption, see Andvig et al. (2000)
and Bardhan (1997). A key policy position follows. The second principle of
the liberal state is that all types of rent-seeking have to be prevented. In partic-
ular, the illegal and semi-legal types of rent-seeking, namely corruption and
clientelism, are the most pernicious, since they are difficult to detect, and
they corrode confidence in modern institutions and in the state.
The third and final element of the good governance model is to explain why
rent-seeking with its negative effects continues to persist. The answer provided
is that although rents impoverish society, they obviously enrich the few who are
the beneficiaries. Hence, for rent-seeking to continue, the majority must be
unable to stop the damage caused to them by powerful minorities. This is step
(iii) in the good governance model shown in Figure 1.1. The absence of democ-
racy allows small groups to monopolize access to the state and engage in
rent-seeking. Rent-seeking in turn consolidates the power of privileged groups,
further undermining democracy. Once again, the relationship between (ii) and
(iii) runs both ways. Thus, the third principle of good governance is that democ-
racy and accountability must be promoted to ensure that minorities are not able to
further their interests at the expense of the majority. The claim that the absence
of democracy allows minorities to seek rents was developed by the ‘new institu-
tional economics’, in particular by North (1990) and Olson (1997, 2000).
The interlocking relationships suggested by the good governance model
imply that societies can be locked into either a good or a bad
political–economic equilibrium. In a ‘bad’ equilibrium, the absence of
democracy supports substantial rent-seeking, which in turn allows the
creation of lots of damaging rents and the economic and political crisis that
follows ensures that democracy never develops. In a good equilibrium,
democracy ensures that rent-seeking and corruption are low, as a result there
are few rents, markets are competitive and economic prosperity and political
stability follow, which in turn ensures that democracy remains stable. An
important consequence of the good governance analysis is therefore that
improvements in economic and political performance can only be achieved if
parallel moves are made on all of these fronts. Economic liberalization,
effective measures against corruption and rent-seeking, moves to deepen
democracy and civil society participation, each have to be simultaneously
pushed to break out of the equilibrium of poor performance.
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The neo-patrimonial analysis
One reason why the good governance framework has received wide support
across academic and policy circles is that its conclusions are broadly
supported by a number of other approaches assessing the performance of
developing country states. In particular, the neo-patrimonial analysis of
corruption and clientelism in developing countries identifies very similar
problems and policy responses. Eisenstadt (1973) and Médard (various
works, summarized in 2002) developed this analysis, based on their work in
African countries. The neo-patrimonial analysis identifies a number of char-
acteristics that differentiate African states from advanced European ones,
and on this basis, it attempts to provide an explanation of poor economic
and political performance in Africa.
The main lines of argument in the neo-patrimonial model are summa-
rized in Figure 1.3. The key characteristic of the neo-patrimonial state is the
personalization of power. This in turn is a product of the absence of democ-
racy and of political accountability. The state is the ‘property’ of the leader
who rules with the help of his clients. This has a number of important polit-
ical effects. One result is that formal rules (laws) are less important than
informal rules based on the use of power. Second, the leader and his clients
operating through patron–client networks dominate politics. Third, corrup-
tion is systemic, operating at all levels of the state since there is no check on
the venality of the supreme power. The effects of this arbitrary and
unchecked power are that the economy is characterized by politically driven
accumulation by the leader and his clients and the economy is, as a result,
totally debilitated. Médard’s analysis distinguishes between different coun-
tries in Africa and points out many subtle differences between them, but
overall they are all variants of a neo-patrimonial type of state that is the
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Figure 1.3 The neo-patrimonial model
antithesis of a modern bureaucratic state. In particular, the political inter-
ventions of the neo-patrimonial state in the economy, and its interventions
in property rights through systemic corruption and outright expropriation
lead to economic backwardness.
Although its analytical roots are different from the neo-liberal model
discussed earlier, there are striking underlying similarities in the way the role of
markets and states is understood. As Figure 1.3 also shows, the neo-patrimo-
nial model’s emphasis on clientelism and corruption describes nothing other
than the dominant forms of rent-seeking in a developing country context. This
is identified as a problem because what follows is politically driven accumula-
tion that disrupts the logic of the market. Disrupting the ‘market’ by politically
driven interventions that create special benefits for some groups is, by defini-
tion, the creation of rents. Thus, the underlying economic analysis of the
neo-patrimonial and good governance models is surprisingly similar. So are the
policy conclusions. Both agree that development requires a separation of the
state from the economy. Neo-patrimonial theorists like Médard do not believe
this can be achieved through liberalization in the first place, since liberalization
on its own can squeeze the state and make it even more predatory. This is
similar to the position taken by many neo-liberal good governance theorists
who argue that without political reform, liberalization cannot be implemented.
And as with the latter, the neo-patrimonial model argues that the separation of
state from society is to be achieved through the promotion of democracy,
accountability and pluralism. These will assist in checking the state’s ability to
act arbitrarily, implicitly inhibiting its ability to create rents.
In this sense, the implicit analytical links in the neo-patrimonial analysis
are quite consistent with the causal links derived from rent-seeking theories
that inform the good governance analysis summarized in Figure 1.1. There
is an even more fundamental similarity in the sequencing of reforms. They
both identify as a policy goal the need to first establish a modern state with
a formal set of rules governing it. This state has to have an impersonal and
non-corrupt professional bureaucracy that does not politically interfere in
the market, and it has to have checks and balances limiting executive power
through an effective democracy. Once all this is in place, a (rent-free)
competitive market economy will follow and will lead to economic and
political progress. Unfortunately, no evidence is provided from recent history
to show that this sequence of reforms has ever worked to accelerate a devel-
opmental transition. Before we discuss the relevance of these approaches for
assessing the Palestinian quasi-state, we need to consider the adequacy of
the good governance framework and the related neo-patrimonial framework
in comparative historical terms.
The role of the state in transformation processes
The good governance model and the related neo-patrimonial model are not
only superficially plausible, the correlation they suggest between variables
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such as democracy and a corruption-free society on the one hand and
economic development on the other is highly desirable from a humanist or
progressive perspective. Unfortunately, the historical evidence suggests a
more complex reality. While a correlation between these variables can indeed
be found in the historical data, the causality between the variables is much
more problematic. The statistical correlation that is observed in cross-
country regressions shows that countries with lower corruption and greater
democracy do indeed have greater wealth and higher growth rates (for
instance, Hall and Jones 1999; Kauffman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 1999;
Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-Lobatón 1998; Clague et al. 1997; World
Bank 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997, 1995; Barro 1996; Mauro 1995). But
these correlations do not establish causality (Khan 2004). Developing coun-
tries are by definition poor and most have low growth rates. Most of them
also have relatively high corruption and weak democracies, or authoritarian
regimes. On the other hand, most advanced countries have the reverse char-
acteristics. It is not surprising that when we correlate these variables, we find
that rich countries are less corrupt and more democratic. But are rich coun-
tries rich because they first instituted democracy and reduced corruption or
do they have viable democracies and low corruption because they first
became rich and are now already developed? Examining sequence is the only
way to test for causation: did advanced countries first achieve democracy
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Figure 1.4 Good governance, state capacities and the capitalist transformation
and the reduction of corruption and then become rich or is it the other way
around? The historical evidence, as opposed to correlation analysis, suggests
that the deepening of democracy and the lowering of corruption were long
historical processes that made serious progress in the early capitalist coun-
tries well after their industrial revolutions.
Most developing countries are located in group 1 in Figure 1.4, with poor
governance characteristics and low growth rates. These failed or failing
states can in turn be classified in various ways: predatory, fragmented clien-
telist and so on. In contrast, advanced countries are mostly in group 3, with
good governance characteristics and somewhat higher growth rates.
Countries in group 1 obviously want to reach group 3 but how do they get
there? The correlation summarized in the regression line suggests that the
appropriate policy is to follow the good governance prescription and
improve the governance characteristics identified in these models; this will
enable a country to go from group 1 to group 3. These are the reforms
shown by arrow C in Figure 1.4. The problem is that we have no historical
evidence of any country achieving a transition to advanced country status
by following the reforms suggested. The recent examples that we have of
countries moving from group 1 to group 3 are the transitions to capitalism
in a small number of developing countries over the last 50 years. These
include countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand and now
China, which are at different stages of a transition from group 1 to group 3.
But in terms of the sequencing of ‘good governance’ characteristics, they
seem to be following the arrows marked A and B rather than the arrow
marked C. If developing countries have any lessons to learn, clearly they
have to look carefully at these recent cases of successful transition and not
primarily at countries that became capitalist centuries ago and are already
very rich. The evidence of historical transitions thus shows that the sequence
of reforms that led these countries to successful capitalist development
contradicts both the good governance and neo-patrimonial policy prescrip-
tions (for a discussion of some of the evidence see Khan 2004, 2002b;
Woo-Cumings 1999; Aoki, Kim and Okuno-Fujiwara 1997; Wade 1990;
Amsden 1989).
During their high-growth transition periods, these developmental coun-
tries were located in the region marked group 2. They scored badly in terms
of democracy, corruption, stability of property rights and other ‘good
governance’ characteristics. Contrary to the neo-patrimonial analysis, they
also suffered from a confusion of formal and informal rules. Political power
was highly centralized and could be used to override formal rules, they had
regimes that relied on variants of clientelism and patron–client networks for
maintaining regime stability, and all of them extensively used political power
for accelerating accumulation by emerging capitalist groups. Clearly, these
countries are the ones that are most relevant for understanding the sequence
involved in successful development. Some of the more advanced of these
successful developing countries subsequently made slow but sustainable
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progress in reducing corruption and deepening democracy, the trajectory
shown by arrow B in Figure 1.4.
This history suggests that the most important task for developing coun-
tries is to identify the reforms shown in arrow A, which could transform
failing states into developmental ones. This involves developing the capaci-
ties of states to push developmental changes in their society, a process we
have described as the capitalist transformation. Success has depended on
identifying and then sustaining and strengthening these developmental char-
acteristics of states. The important point is that historically, developing these
transformation capacities has not necessarily involved a prior reduction of
corruption, clientelism, patron–client networks, the centralization of power,
the instability of property rights or any of the features identified in the good
governance and neo-patrimonial models. Nevertheless, it has involved wide-
ranging changes in institutions, policies and politics that enhanced specific
state capacities to push developmental changes, manage necessary rents and
destroy damaging rents. Indirectly, this had the effect of changing the types
of corruption, clientelism and rent-seeking that were prevalent even if the
aggregate amount did not immediately go down significantly. We argue that
the critical role of the state in development can be better understood by
distinguishing between different types of rents and rent-seeking (including
differences in the types of corruption and patron–client networks), and this
enables us to distinguish successful transformations from the others.
There are, of course, high-growth cases like Indonesia where the state
failed to deepen democracy and reduce corruption fast enough and as a
result suffered a precipitous collapse of legitimacy during an economic
crisis. Clearly while sustained economic development is necessary for the
sustainable deepening of democracy and the achievement of lower corrup-
tion, it is not sufficient. The trajectory shown in arrow B is by no means
automatic and does require institutional and political attention, but these
are only likely to be viable if the conditions for viable growth have already
been achieved. This sequence and prioritization is markedly different from
that proposed by the good governance and neo-patrimonial models, where
the reform priorities are shown by the arrow marked C in Figure 1.4. Here,
the sequence is to first achieve the good governance characteristics of a
liberal-democratic state, and then the expectation is that higher growth will
be realized. But to repeat, there is no evidence that such a strategy has
worked in the past (Khan 2004).
Even cross-country correlations, for all their shortcomings, show that the
relationships between good governance characteristics and economic perfor-
mance are quite complex. For instance, it is not the case that democracy is
always associated with lower corruption even when we pool advanced and
developing countries. The effect of democracy on lower corruption is found
in some studies to be very weak and if it operates at all, it does so with a
time lag of several decades. This suggests that the main determinant of lower
corruption may be economic development, since only countries that grow
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reasonably fast can sustain democracy over decades (Treisman 2000).
Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) also find that rises in per capita incomes
precede the emergence of democracy and not the other way round,
suggesting that economic development may be a precondition for democ-
racy, rather than democracy being a precondition for economic
development.
Let us be clear though about what this historical evidence is telling us. It
is not saying that we should not be worried about corruption or democracy.
Instead it is saying that to attack these problems we have to ensure that the
conditions for rapid development are achieved. This requires targeting
damaging rents and rent-seeking that can have extremely negative effects on
growth. On the other hand, it requires an enhancement of state capacities to
create and manage necessary rents, both for political stabilization and for
accelerating the emergence of capitalists and regulating their incentives. It
follows that the rent-free market is not a very useful benchmark for judging
the efficiency of a transformation economy. The challenge for policy-makers
is to be able to identify damaging monopolies, transfers to unproductive
groups and other damaging rents, with their associated rent-seeking and
corruption, and to tackle the causes of these rents vigorously. On the other
hand, if the capacity of the state to create and manage the rents necessary
for political stabilization or the rents necessary for accelerating the capitalist
transformation are removed, far from more rapid development, we may
instead see a collapse. In the case of a conflict economy, where rents may
also be used as a mechanism through which one country or group attempts
to exert influence over another, there is an added and critical dimension of
the problem that affects our assessment of the efficiency or otherwise of
other rents.
We will argue that when we look at the redistributive rents, monopolies
and other transfers that the PNA was involved in creating and managing, we
observe a complex picture. Some of these rents were indeed damaging and if
their scope increased over time, the future Palestinian state would be
doomed to remain in group 1 in Figure 1.4, with other poorly performing
developing country states. However, we will argue that many rents managed
by the PNA were dynamic rents that gave the emerging Palestinian economy
some of the characteristics of group 2 countries. Given the very limited
formal powers of the quasi-state, the adverse external constraints, and the
context of extreme uncertainty about the future, these developmental char-
acteristics of the PNA were quite remarkable. But given the high
growth-rates achieved in Palestine under the PNA, shown in Table 1.1, it
should not be surprising to discover that the PNA had some developmental
rent-management capacities. If a Palestinian transition to a group 3 country
is to be accelerated, these incipient powers and capacities of the fledgling
quasi-state would need to be developed in the future. Before we look at some
of the specific features of the Palestinian quasi-state, we will identify some
of the general issues that transformation states have had to address.
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Property rights and rents
The foundation of the good governance model, shown in point (i) in Figure
1.1, is that a rent-free economy with stable property rights is the most effi-
cient market structure for development. This is a fundamental proposition
of liberal economic theory, but it has significant shortcomings when
applied to developing countries. Economic development is not just a
process of making ‘the market’ work better. Development historically has
involved the emergence and growth of a capitalist sector. Even in the most
volatile and vulnerable contexts, the creation of a viable capitalist sector is
usually a critical requirement for achieving economic, and therefore polit-
ical viability. Far from requiring the stability of property rights and the
absence of rents, development is a period of momentous changes in the
structure of property rights. It involves the emergence of new classes
through processes that involve the creation and management of substantial
rents as well as disruptions of pre-capitalist property rights. Far from state
withdrawal from the market being a necessary condition for a successful
capitalist transition, the historical evidence suggests that it is necessary for
the state to intervene to accelerate the emergence of capitalists and assist
and discipline them in the acquisition of technological capacity. By defini-
tion, this requires state support for ‘politically driven accumulation’,
contrary to the neo-patrimonial model (Figure 1.3). The relevant state
capacity in these contexts is its ability to carry out the appropriate social
transformations, its ability to allocate rents to emerging capitalists, disci-
pline them if they do not perform, and to use rents to maintain social
stability at acceptable levels (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Aoki, Kim and
Okuno-Fujiwara 1997; Woo-Cumings 1999; Khan 2004).
Before a capitalist economy has become dominant, the accumulation
that drives the emergence of capitalism has usually required state assistance
to transfer resources to the emerging capitalist sector from non-capitalist
sectors and activities. These types of accumulation classically have been
referred to as primitive accumulation. Primitive accumulation is common
when pre-capitalist production systems have become unviable but a viable
capitalism has not yet emerged. Stabilizing the pre-existing but economi-
cally unviable pre-capitalist rights is not possible, nor is capitalism likely to
emerge rapidly through the operation of a market in such a context.
Examples of non-market transfers of rights that have played a critical role
in the transition to capitalism have included compulsory land reform (in
South Korea, Taiwan and China) and transfers of assets to emerging capi-
talists through state-owned or controlled banking systems (South Korea,
Malaysia, and many other developing countries). They have included state-
supported seizures of natural resources, and in particular of land, by
emerging capitalists (in Thailand in the 1980s, during the English
Enclosures of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, and during the west-
ward expansion of the United States of America into Indian territories till
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well into the nineteenth century). They have also included more subtle
mechanisms such as exchange rate controls that have been used to transfer
resources from peasant agriculture to emerging industrial capitalists (in
most developing countries). This is not an exhaustive list, but it reminds us
that state actions during rapid transformations typically have not been to
stabilize pre-existing allocations of resources, but more often to directly or
indirectly change that allocation, if necessary by radically disrupting prior
property rights systems (Khan 2002b). It also tells us that politically driven
accumulation and the rent-seeking associated with it is unavoidable during
this period of development.
Yet, it is also clear that in many cases the result of such interventions in
property rights has only been destructive. Unstable property rights have
often been associated with predation and plunder. Unfortunately, this is the
more usual story in the typical developing country where state officials and
their clients capture resources, subsidies and credit to enrich themselves, and
they do not go on to become productive capitalists. Nevertheless, the differ-
ence between dynamic and collapsing developing countries is not that in the
dynamic countries property rights were stable, and politically driven accu-
mulation did not occur. Rather the difference was a subtler one. In the
dynamic group, the transformation of property rights rapidly took these
societies in the direction of viable and dynamic capitalist economies.
Ensuring this required different combinations of conditions, but most often,
it required a state that could discipline primitive accumulation and ensure
that those who were enriching themselves remained productive. Over a
period, this resulted in growth and development that in turn allowed a deep-
ening of democracy and the achievement of greater accountability. The
problem in most non-dynamic developing countries is that property rights
are transferred to unproductive classes and groups who do not graduate to
become productive capitalists for a variety of reasons, including the failure
of the state to adequately assist or discipline them. In these more typical
cases, economic and political development is stifled. But it would be wrong
to argue that development would be faster if these countries could stabilize
property rights and prevent their states from intervening. There is no
example in history where stabilizing pre-capitalist rights accelerated the
transition to capitalism.
The good governance and neo-patrimonial frameworks are also wrong
to argue that successful development requires the absence of rents. In fact,
economic theory recognizes that many rents are essential for the efficient
operation of a market economy (Stiglitz 1996; Aoki, Kim and Okuno-
Fujiwara 1997). The problem is that ‘good’ rents can very easily become
‘bad’ rents and effective rent-management capacities of the state are critical
for success. For instance, redistributive rents are essential for achieving
political stabilization, even though they can have disincentive effects on
those who are taxed. Properly managed, the benefits of stabilization can
more than compensate for these costs. However, in other cases redistribu-
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tive rents can impose costs that are greater than the benefit of the political
stability that is achieved: and in the worst cases, redistribution can even
result in lower political stability! Similarly, ‘developmental’ rents for capital-
ists can create incentives for the generation of information, and for
risk-taking and innovation (Khan 2000a). For instance, patent laws, compe-
tition laws, and taxes and subsidies can create rents for innovators and
risk-takers in ways that improve economic performance. But here too,
mismanaging these rents can do more harm than good. Rents for risk-
takers that last too long simply convert them into monopolists. The aim of
rent-regulation is to create incentives, say for innovation, but also to ensure
that these rents do not last for so long that they become monopoly rents. In
advanced countries, there are sophisticated institutions such as competition
regulators and courts that exercise judgement in eliminating wasteful
monopoly rents while protecting rents that create incentives for national
innovation and risk-taking.
In developing countries, the need for making considered judgements
about the social value of different rents is even greater, but the capacity for
making such judgements is much less developed. Ironically, the economic
models of free-market economics have prevented international agencies
from providing support to developing countries to develop these critical
rent-management capacities. Rents are important in all developing countries
to encourage emerging capitalists and assist them to acquire entrepreneurial
and technological skills, but they are particularly important in conflict soci-
eties like Palestine where capitalists would not otherwise be sufficiently
attracted (Aoki, Kim and Okuno-Fujiwara 1997; Khan 2000a). Of course,
many other rents, like monopoly rents, are indeed harmful, and states must
have the capacity to identify and remove them. Thus, economic theory tells
us that different types of rents can be beneficial or damaging for society. But
even the potentially beneficial rents have to be managed and regulated if
they are to have a beneficial effect.
In advanced countries, the redistribution of income that is required for
political stabilization is usually organized in a transparent way through the
budget. States in developing countries also have to maintain social and polit-
ical stability, but the absence of sufficient budgetary resources often means
that political stabilization works through the allocation of resources to crit-
ical clients within patron–client networks. By definition, the resources for
such targeted redistribution necessary for stabilization does not come from
the budget. Clientelism is thus a way of achieving political stability in a
context of resource scarcity. The distribution of rents to clients through
patron–client networks can take a variety of forms, ranging from job
creation in public enterprises to outright subsidies. If the same degree of
political stability had to be achieved through general fiscal transfers, broader
categories of recipients would have to be identified that included the politi-
cally critical individuals and factions as a subset. Clearly, much greater fiscal
resources would be required to achieve this.
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The historical evidence from developing countries suggests that clien-
telism is only likely to end when states have the fiscal resources to
maintain political stability through general transfers, in other words,
when a substantial degree of economic development has already been
achieved. Not surprisingly, and in contrast to the claims of the neo-patri-
monial model, we find variants of patron–client networks in all
developing countries, including the high-growth ones, before they eventu-
ally make a transition to political management through transparent fiscal
redistributions. The difference between dynamic developing country states
and the others is not that the former did not engage in clientelism while
the latter did. Rather, in the dynamic countries, states possessed the
ability to discipline and control their clients to ensure that a rapid capi-
talist transformation took place. In non-developmental states, the clients
of the state are unproductive, just as the neo-patrimonial model argues,
and the state lacks the capacity and eventually the inclination to do
anything about it. Thus in contrast to point (i) in the good governance
model in Figure 1.1, the transformation approach recognizes that property
right interventions are necessarily widespread in all developing countries; in
addition some types of rents are critical for growth and political viability
while others are indeed damaging.
Rent-seeking and corruption
If we move to point (ii) of the good governance model outlined in Figure
1.1, rent-seeking theory is correct in its claim that if rents exist, so will rent-
seeking. Individuals and groups will spend resources to capture or retain
rents. If many types of rents are essential for the social transformation, we
should expect a considerable amount of rent-seeking to be characteristic of
this period. Indeed this is what we observe in every developing country
without exception. Since rents in some countries can be mostly damaging
and in other countries mostly growth-enhancing, rent-seeking can be associ-
ated with both growth and stagnation. This overturns the link made in step
(ii) of the good governance logic in Figure 1.1 that suggests that rent-seeking
and corruption are always associated with poor economic outcomes. The
neo-patrimonial model in Figure 1.3 also associates systemic corruption
with poor performance, and this model too is challenged by our observation
that extensive rents and political interventions are necessary in all devel-
oping countries. In fact, even advanced countries have massive rent-seeking
as part of the institutional structure of their democracies. The only differ-
ence between advanced and developing countries is that in the former a
bigger part of overall rent-seeking is legal, having become institutionalized
in the form of many different forms of lobbying, political contributions to
parties, legal costs, entertainment accounts and so on. In contrast, in devel-
oping countries, a bigger share of rent-seeking takes the form of corruption
or expenditures on patron–client networks. Part of this difference is due to
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an inadequate institutionalization of rent-seeking, which is difficult to
achieve before a reasonably stable economic structure has emerged.
The most important point that follows from our analysis is that the
types of rents that are being created through processes of rent-seeking and
corruption are critically important. This is the main difference between
countries, not the presence or absence of rent-seeking, since the latter is
widespread in every society. This is shown in Figure 1.5, which can be
contrasted with the liberal market perspective summarized in Figure 1.2.
While rent-seeking and corruption always have a cost, they may be associ-
ated with rents that are critical for growth and social transformation. In
these cases, the overall effect of A  B in Figure 1.5 can be positive even in
the presence of significant costs due to rent-seeking and corruption. In
contrast to the good governance proposition that all corruption and rent-
seeking have to be attacked, in point (ii) in Figure 1.1, the policy
conclusions of the transformation approach are more complex. Given the
impossibility of ruling out all rents, the task for policy must be to prevent the
creation of damaging rents, and the types of corruption associated with
these, while enhancing the state’s capacity to create and manage develop-
mental rents. There will inevitably be rent-seeking associated with
developmental rents, and here policy should seek to legalize and regulate this
rent-seeking. This approach directs our attention to the factors deter-
mining the types of rents that are demanded and created in different
societies rather than the impossible ‘good governance’ task of trying to
create a rent-free market economy.
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Figure 1.5 Rent-seeking in the real world
The neo-liberal policy conclusion that ending corruption at any cost is a
precondition for progress is based on the assumption that a no-rent economy
is both possible and desirable in a developing economy. In contrast, the
social transformation perspective suggests that the fight against corruption
has to distinguish between the corruption associated with damaging rents
and the corruption associated with essential rents. In the former case, anti-
corruption can aim to get rid of both the corruption and the rents
associated with it. But in the latter case, anti-corruption strategies have to be
very careful to target only the corruption, while strengthening the capacity of
the state to create and manage these rents. A simplistic anti-corruption
strategy that damaged the capacity of the state to create and manage devel-
opmental rents could do more harm than good. The long-term goal for
these rents would be to legalize and regulate the associated rent-seeking,
rather than get rid of the rents.
Democracy and rent-seeking
Finally, step (iii) in the good governance model in Figure 1.1 claims that
democracy limits the rent-creating interventions of the state, and the
absence of democracy is also the key driver of the neo-patrimonial model
in Figure 1.3. This argument too is theoretically and empirically weak.
Democracy is supposed to be desirable because it makes politically driven
interventions in the economy (in other words rent-creation) more difficult.
But we have already seen that some rent-creation and politically driven
accumulation may be both necessary and desirable during the transforma-
tion period and beyond. Moreover, if democracy reduced corruption,
developing country democracies like India would have less corruption than
non-democratic developing countries. The evidence does not even support
this conclusion (see Treisman 2000). And if democracy reduced rent-
seeking in general, we would expect advanced countries with mature
democracies to suffer the least from rent-seeking. But in fact, advanced
country democracies suffer from massive, though mostly legal rent-seeking,
in the form of lobbying, contributions to political parties, expenditures on
consultancies and so on. In advanced countries, popular majorities do not
succeed in preventing rent-seeking by minority interests in agriculture, or
the oil and arms industries, for example. The obvious explanation is that in
democracies, minorities find it easier to organize compared to majorities
particularly when the minorities are smaller and richer than the majority. In
fact, it is widely recognized that stable democracies suffer from very exten-
sive rent-seeking driven by well-organized vested-interest groups (for
instance, Olson 1982).
Far from democracy being a bastion against rent-seeking, it would be
more accurate to describe democracy as a form of institutionalized rent-
seeking, where rules are defined for different groups to seek rents through
the political process. The historical evidence is that democracy becomes
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truly viable when productive and growth-enhancing groups become big
enough and organized enough to use democracy to protect and promote
their interests (Moore 1991; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992).
Meaningful democracy also requires substantial fiscal resources such that
legitimate demands for redistribution can be met legally through fiscal redis-
tributions (Khan 2002a). These conditions too are unlikely to be met before
substantial development has already occurred. Without them, democracy is
likely either to remain vulnerable, as it is in most developing countries, or to
break down entirely if unproductive groups are large, powerful or organized
enough to democratically capture political power.
In advanced capitalist countries, we find that the rents created through
the democratic process are usually not totally debilitating for a number of
reasons. One reason is that when capitalism has become the dominant sector
in the economy, long-term growth in the incomes and welfare of all classes
and groups, including those who are not capitalists, depends on the growth
of the capitalist sector. Hurting the capitalist sector impacts rapidly on
virtually everyone and this prevents other groups creating rents that hurt the
capitalist sector too much. Since the well-being of the state also depends on
the health of the capitalist sector, advanced country states have regulatory
structures that can discriminate between acceptable and damaging rents.
Thus, instead of democracy preventing rent-seeking in advanced capitalist
countries, we find a large amount of rent-seeking that is nevertheless (on the
whole) consistent with dominant capitalist interests and economic growth
(Khan 2002a).
In contrast, the link between democracy and development is more prob-
lematic in developing countries. Developing countries, whether or not they
have democracy, are not, by definition, dominated by capitalism. Rent-
creation that damages capitalist growth has a negligible effect on most people
because the capitalist sector is itself negligible. By definition, the politically
powerful groups and factions driving politics in developing countries are not
yet dominated by capitalists. As a result, democracy in developing countries
does not provide any institutional guarantee that rents that may damage the
emergence of capitalism will not be created, but neither does authoritari-
anism. In general, the outcome of the political process, whether democratic
or authoritarian, is much more open in developing countries in terms of the
types of rents that are created. The outcome can sometimes be a predomi-
nance of productive rents but often it can be a predominance of damaging
rents and destructive property right interventions. The implication is that
democracy cannot be an instrumental variable in developing countries
despite the claim in point (iii) of the good governance approach in Figure 1.1
or the neo-patrimonial model of Figure 1.3. In the social transformation
approach, democracy is supported as an end in itself; the viability of democracy
depends on getting other institutional and political conditions right so that the
rents created through the democratic process are value-enhancing and the state
has the institutional and political capacity to manage these rents.
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Characterizing the emerging Palestinian state
In this section, we will review what the evidence tells us about the dominant
types of rents and rent-seeking in Palestine under the PNA. This in turn will
help us to say something about the transformation capacities of the state.
Over the period we are looking at, we find that there is no clear dominance
of some types of rents over others. This is obviously because an identifiable
type of Palestinian state hardly existed. Instead, a number of quite different
types of rents and rent-seeking could be observed in emergent form in the
Palestinian quasi-state, and under different circumstances, each of a number
of different constellations of rents and rent-seeking may have consolidated
to become the dominant ones. To help our analysis, we identify four ‘types’
of state that could have consolidated in Palestine, each defined by the
combination of a particular constellation of rents. These state types are
purely descriptive and are defined by the predominance of certain types of
rents. Our focus is also restricted to Palestinian territories over this period,
and these state types are not necessarily relevant for other cases. We begin by
reviewing the types of rents and rent-seeking that were observed in Palestine
over this period, and the political processes with which they were associated.
Rents in the Palestinian context
Many rents in the Palestinian context were directly the result of the specific
arrangements set up by the Oslo Agreements. But other rent-management
problems were more like those faced by all developing country states. Some
rents were intrinsic to the promotion of capitalists and the attraction of
new technologies and investments. As in other developing countries, these
rents could play a dynamic role, but under quite likely conditions, they
could also become very damaging and reduce growth. And finally, some
redistributive rents were critical for political stabilization and were recog-
nized as such by external donors. These rents too, have in some contexts
played a useful role in stabilizing the polity, and at other times have gone
out of control and caused a lot of damage. Looking at some of these rents
helps to identify the critical issues of rent-management in the Palestinian
context and the conditions assisting or blocking a potentially successful
transformation in Palestine.
Monopolies
There are a number of reasons why we would expect to have seen some
degree of monopolistic market power in the Palestinian economy. First,
economies of scale can make many firms “natural monopolies” in a small
economy like that of Palestine. The most efficient way of producing often
involves companies that are so big relative to the economy that one or two
can dominate the market. These firms are then able to raise prices and
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earn monopoly profits. Services like telecommunications, or utilities like
electricity and water (if the Palestinian economy were allowed to develop
its own utility supplies) are very likely to be natural monopolies in a small
economy. But large firms in these sectors may still be the most efficient
alternative provided an efficient regulatory structure ensures that profits
are not excessive and the most efficient managers are selected. For regula-
tion to be effective, regulators would have to have the capacity to assess
performance, as well as have the political power to impose penalties if
managers proved to be inefficient. Thus, enhancing efficiency does not
always dictate the destruction of natural monopolies, but always requires
their effective regulation.
A second factor that made monopolies quite likely in the Palestinian
economy was the nature of the trade and import conditions imposed by
Israel under the aegis of Oslo. These conditions ensured that virtually all
imports into the Palestinian territories had to take place through Israel
(the monopolies are discussed further in Chapter 2 by Hilal and Khan,
and Chapter 5 by Nasr). Israel’s control of borders allowed it to protect
its own domestic monopolies in critical commodities like cement and
petroleum. For instance, in the case of cement, the Nesher Company of
Israel was an effective cement monopoly in the greater Israeli market that
included the Palestinian territories. The Oslo Agreements and the Paris
Economic Protocol allowed the Palestinians to import limited quantities
of specified commodities from non-Israeli sources, but in practice, these
imports could be obstructed by Israeli customs and security checks. If
Israeli border guards decided to open every bag of cement to hunt for
weapons, the imports allowed to the Palestinians from outside Israel
could be disrupted at any time. On the other hand, importing cement
from Israel meant allowing an Israeli monopoly to extract rents from
Palestinian consumers.
While the PNA could not bypass Israel’s control of its borders, it did have
the power to prevent access by Israeli companies to Palestinian markets. The
outcome that eventually emerged was a Palestinian cement monopoly that
bought cement at world prices from Nesher and sold it on to Palestinians at
or even slightly above the Israeli price. This arrangement allowed the Israeli
monopoly to retain monopoly pricing within the Israeli customs union while
the PNA could earn margins that contributed to its own survival given the
very limited tax revenues it could collect from other sources (Lagerquist
2003). Given these circumstances, how should we evaluate the implications
of the trading monopolies set up by the PNA? On the one hand, they prob-
ably did not make matters much worse for Palestinian consumers given that
Israeli monopolies existed anyway, and attempts to import from third coun-
tries would very probably be impeded by Israel. On the other hand, the
Palestinian trading monopolies allowed the Palestinian Authority to capture
some of the rents that would otherwise have passed to Israel. Assessing the
social efficiency of these monopolies thus requires an explicit consideration
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of the trade and fiscal agreements that the PNA had to sign with Israel as
part of the Oslo Agreements (Chapter 2 by Hilal and Khan).
A third issue with respect to the role of monopolies in Palestine is related
to the problem of attracting investment into a conflict zone. The rights of
investors in Palestine were uncertain given that the end game in terms of the
eventual Palestinian state was itself hardly clear. Much more than the infant
industry struggling to learn new technologies in the typical developing
country, investors in a conflict zone like Palestine require temporary rents to
induce them to invest anything at all. The PNA’s problem was that it did not
have the resources to offer any direct inducements to new investors, particu-
larly expatriate Palestinian investors who were taking big risks to invest in
the emerging state. We will see in the chapters in this volume by Hilal and
Khan, and by Nasr, that one of the ways in which the PNA attracted new
investors was to offer them temporary monopolies, or at least substantial
market power in key sectors like telecommunications by limiting entry in
favour of critical investors.
Was this a socially damaging strategy? The answer depends on an assess-
ment of the viable alternatives. On the one hand, market power in these
sectors did mean higher prices for consumers. Indeed that was the intent,
thereby giving investors sufficient rents to attract them to Palestine. On the
other hand, the economy collectively benefited from investments and tech-
nologies that might otherwise not have been attracted at all. Far from being
a simple story, this evidence suggests that there were contradictory forces at
work within the Palestinian state, with at least some conditions supporting
rent-allocation in ways that maintained economic dynamism and political
stabilization. Expatriate investors were attracted, and at least in some cases,
the more efficient were systematically preferred. Thus while some monopo-
listic arrangements were clearly restrictive practices in the classic textbook
sense, a number of apparently monopolistic arrangements may not have
been as damaging as they appear at first sight. Indeed, in creating and
managing these monopolies, the PNA displayed some nascent develop-
mental capacities, and an intelligent policy of engagement would have
sought to strengthen these nascent state capacities.
Redistributive (transfer) rents
Redistribution is a necessary part of social stabilization in every society. In
the conflict situation in which the PNA found itself, it is not surprising that
substantial redistributive rents were politically necessary to stabilize the
polity by accommodating critical constituencies. But more than 60 per cent
of the PNA’s revenues depended on taxes collected in the first instance by
Israel from Palestinians and then transferred to the PNA, and aid accounted
for around 10 per cent of GDP over this period (Chapter 6 by Fjeldstad and
Zagha). This excessive fiscal vulnerability of the PNA gave considerable
potential leverage to those responsible for clearing the transfers required for
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its day-to-day survival. The symbiotic interest of both the Israeli and the
Palestinian side in being able to allocate these rents in ways that furthered
their interests resulted in some unexpected ‘institutional’ arrangements. For
instance, the Israeli government paid part of the official tax remittances
owed to the PNA into accounts outside the Palestinian Ministry of Finance
that were directly controlled by Arafat and his financial advisor,
Muhammad Rashid (Lagerquist 2003; IMF 2003: 88).
Since Israel colluded for many years in these arrangements, until after the
beginning of the Second Intifada, we can conclude that these arrangements
were initially advantageous for both sides. On the one hand, the situation
allowed Israel to withhold transfers at will without having to formally justify
this, thereby maximizing its leverage over Arafat and the PNA. At the same
time, Arafat’s executive maximized its freedom of allocation over these
resources and was able to use them for political stabilization in ways that
might be difficult in a fully accountable system. While the existence of these
accounts was well known from the outset, Israel only began to mobilize
international concern with Arafat’s special accounts when it became clear
during the Second Intifada that Arafat had refused to construct the type of
client state that was on offer from Israel (Hilal and Khan discuss the special
accounts at greater length in Chapter 2).
The executive in turn used a large part of its vulnerable fiscal resources to
create jobs to stabilize the polity. The explosion of employment in the public
sector and in the security agencies followed from these political concerns.
This kind of job creation effectively creates redistributive rents for critical
constituencies. The challenge is to evaluate how damaging these redistribu-
tive rents were, by examining their cost in terms of economic inefficiency as
against the political stabilization they achieved. If the economic inefficiency
of these transfers is to be outweighed by the benefits of political stabiliza-
tion, the state has to be able to control effectively the type and allocation of
these redistributive rents. If powerful clients can force the creation of a
growing number of damaging redistributive rents, economic inefficiency can
rapidly escalate and the political stability that is purchased can be illusory
(Khan 2000b). In our investigation of the Palestinian context, (Chapter 2 by
Hilal and Khan) we find that individual Palestinian factions were not strong
enough to veto the executive’s allocation of redistributive rents. In other
words, even though as in every developing country much redistribution was
necessary for stability, in the Palestinian case the executive retained the
ability to determine the type and allocation of these redistributive rents. This
makes the Palestinian case potentially different from some of the more
serious cases of state failure in developing countries.
A second redistributive imperative in developing countries is the need to
make resources available to emerging capitalists to accelerate the emergence
of capitalism from essentially pre-capitalist societies. Accelerating the devel-
opment of the productive sector often involves giving tax breaks, subsidies,
subsidized credit or other inducements to emerging capitalists as part of a
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strategy of promoting capitalism. The pay-off from such a strategy depends
on the state’s regulatory framework and whether it can ensure that these
privileged individuals deliver growth. In the Palestinian case, the very limited
state powers under the Oslo Agreements meant that the resources available
for direct redistribution to emerging capitalists were extremely limited. There
were some tax breaks for investors that are examined in Chapter 6 on taxa-
tion by Fjeldstad and Zagha. But the most important incentive for potential
investors came from the creation of effective partial monopolies in the way
discussed earlier, and examined here in the chapters by Hilal and Khan (pp.
000–00) and Nasr (pp. 000–00).
Finally, some of the redistribution that happened could only be
described as predatory. This consisted of forced transfers from small
traders and merchants to security officials, customs and tax officials and
others, in ways familiar to most developing countries. Examples of such
predatory behaviour were, however, less widespread in Palestine than in
equivalent developing countries elsewhere in the world. But to the extent
that these processes were going on, they were clearly very damaging. It is
important to point out that we are not suggesting that the Palestinian
Authority necessarily created any of these rents as the outcome of a delib-
erate plan or careful foresight. Indeed that is rarely the case in any country.
On the contrary, we argue that a number of structural, political, institu-
tional and external factors have to be taken into account to explain the
specific patterns of rent-creation. In promoting the capacity of the state to
manage developmental rents and limit damaging rents, these factors need
to become targets of policy.
Corruption and rent-seeking in Palestine
The theory of rent-seeking suggests that each of the important types of
rents observed in the Palestinian context might be associated with a
specific process of rent-seeking or corruption. Beginning with the most
damaging types of rents and rent-seeking, there was undoubtedly evidence
in Palestine of rent-seeking associated with straightforward predatory
extortion. Extortion in Palestine was mostly a low-level activity by officials
managing a highly restrictive network of security. The rent-seeking expen-
ditures associated with these predatory activities were resources spent by
officials to get into positions that allowed them to extort, and expenditures
by citizens to evade extortion. Fischer, Said and Valdivieso (2001: 73) esti-
mate that for trade with the outside world, Israeli security restrictions
directly resulted in Palestinian businesses facing costs that were 30 to 45
per cent higher than those faced by equivalent Israeli companies. Israeli
customs and security officials thus had the power to financially destroy
Palestinian traders by delaying their goods at borders. This gave them not
only powers of occasional extortion but also ultimately the power to
ensure that Palestinian traders would cooperate with Israeli economic and
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political interests. Thus, it was often cheaper for Palestinians to engage in
corruption to bypass Israeli restrictions, or to pay Israelis to import or
release goods through security points and thereby earn easy margins.
Similar security checks and checkpoints had to be maintained on the
Palestinian side, though the restrictions were relatively less onerous.
Nevertheless, similar exactions on the Palestinian side inevitably
happened. Most journalistic reports refer to relatively small though
systematic exactions by Palestinian officials at borders and crossings, or
tolls collected by security personnel. There is no clear evidence that the
Palestinian security forces operating within the Palestinian territories were
significantly more corrupt or extractive than the Israeli military govern-
ment that preceded them, and no evidence that Palestinian security forces
carried out outright looting as Israeli troops did in Palestinian areas
during Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 (Lagerquist 2003).
Since the Israelis were an occupying force and could therefore get away
with high levels of looting and extortion, it would be more relevant to
compare extortion by Palestinian security forces with the experience of
internal extortion in other developing countries. While such judgements
inevitably have to be impressionistic rather than quantitative, the Palestinian
territories suffered relatively little from extreme forms of extortion, for
instance by warlords linked to crime. Nevertheless, since any restrictions that
generate this type of extortion and corruption are themselves damaging for
the economy, there can be no disagreement that the removal or reduction of
these extractions is highly desirable. But clearly a significant reduction in
this type of extortion would be contingent on restructuring the system of
checkpoints and gatekeepers, and extortion is unlikely to be significantly
reduced by reforming the Palestinian security forces alone.
The much bigger transfers associated with political stabilization created
their own structures of rent-seeking and influence-buying. These rent-
seeking activities included, most importantly, the PNA’s investments in
security to assure external powers to release PNA resources on time, and the
establishment of personalized networks between Palestinian officials and
critically placed individuals in the Israeli administration to negotiate and
facilitate the transfers. While it is easy to understand the functional necessity
for these special accounts given the external constraints, there was obviously
the possibility of misuse and misappropriation by rent-seekers with access to
the executive. Indeed, we might expect that since the PNA had resources that
were going to be used for political stabilization, there would have been some,
maybe even substantial amounts of rent-seeking by political factions seeking
to get a share of these rents. All of these types of rent-seeking were the
result of the systemic presence of rents that were available to the executive
for political stabilization as part of the design of the Oslo architecture and
the necessity of at least some of these expenditures during a period of
contested state formation. Thus, it is not the case that rent-seeking or
corruption was driving the creation of these rents in any simple sense. On the
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contrary, the rent-seeking and corruption associated with these rents were
the result of specific rents that were created and managed as a necessary part
of the Oslo Agreements.
Nevertheless, these rent-seeking expenditures, for instance in maintaining
patron–client networks, had a clear social cost. But the net effect of the rents
distributed by the PNA for political stabilization was not necessarily nega-
tive. Much of these redistributive rents were used for job creation in the
security services. The direct effect of many of these rents was very likely
negative because sectors such as security were not high priority in terms of
social needs, and they allowed the employment of individuals who were not
best qualified for specific service-delivery sectors. Nevertheless, to the extent
that this employment-generation achieved political stability, it had a positive
economic effect in the form of faster development, greater investments and
so on, compared to the alternative of social disruption by disaffected
groups. The net effect of such stabilization rents may be positive or negative
depending on the allocation and management of such rents, and the net
positive effect may be big enough to also outweigh the rent-seeking costs in
terms of the costs of maintaining patron–client networks, corruption, and
so on. These judgements are difficult to quantify precisely, but before 2000,
a significant degree of political stabilization was achieved by the PNA
through these mechanisms, and this did create a context for considerable
external investments despite the overall context of uncertainty and conflict
with Israel.
Finally, we have seen that a number of rents have historically been critical
for economic development, and the PNA was involved in the creation and
management of some of these developmental rents. With these rents too,
there is bound to be some associated rent-seeking and even corruption.
However, if (as in the East Asian countries) a developmental state can allo-
cate these rents efficiently, then even though corruption is always
undesirable, some amount of corruption can co-exist with rapid develop-
ment. As the economy becomes more developed and a capitalist class
entrenches, some of this corruption is rapidly converted into legal influence-
buying in the form of lobbying and political contributions, and the more
damaging aspects of this corruption can be outlawed. The real problem
emerges when a state lacks the capacity to create growth-enhancing rents. In
these cases, states end up supporting inefficient industries and growth-
reducing transfers. The corruption that is associated with these rents
effectively allows inefficient capitalists to buy themselves protection, or
maintain their damaging monopoly profits or subsidies, and the overall
effect can be massively negative (Khan 1996a, b). Thus while the focus on
corruption is important, its significance is to enable us to identify the causes
preventing states from playing a dynamic transformation role. A state with
high transformation capacities could perform well with some degree of
corruption, but it would obviously perform even better if corruption could
be reduced. But a state that lacks transformation capacities would not neces-
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sarily perform much better if it got rid of all corruption. Most seriously, if a
badly constructed reform aiming to reduce corruption and increase account-
ability damaged the limited capacities of such a state to create and manage
developmental rents, the results could paradoxically be very negative. In the
chapter by Hilal and Khan, we will consider whether some of the post-2000
governance reforms that were pushed through in the PNA under external
pressure may have had just such damaging effects.
Democracy in Palestine
Quite apart from the general problems of deepening democracy in devel-
oping countries, Palestine and the PNA faced some special problems over
this period. This is because the PNA was clearly not set up through the Oslo
Agreements primarily to deliver democracy to Palestinians. Its primary
objective was to negotiate the territorial and constitutional limits of a
Palestinian quasi-state in the context of an extreme asymmetry of power
and resources vis-à-vis Israel. To get anything at all, it had to demonstrate
its ability to deliver security to Israel on terms determined by the latter. In
turn, this meant that from the beginning, there were serious conflicts
between the immediate democratic rights of the Palestinian opponents of
this particular ‘peace process’ and the imperative of maintaining security.
The implications were well understood and widely reported from the outset
by human rights organizations.
A particular problem for the operation of democracy in the Authority
was that it had to allocate Israeli controlled fiscal resources to achieve polit-
ical stabilization and security. For these redistributive rents to be allocated
transparently, we have to ask if it might have been possible to institution-
alize and legalize the transfers necessary for political stabilization in the
Palestinian context. Transparent and democratic regulation of these rents in
such a context would be highly desirable but would not be simple. The
public regulation of these transfers would require the prior existence of a
majority in Palestine that agreed about the aims that were to be achieved
through political stabilization. For instance, it would have to agree that it
was proper and necessary for these transfers to be ultimately controlled by
Israel during the interim period and perhaps beyond, with Israel retaining
the fiscal and political capacity to halt these transfers if Israeli aims were
not being achieved. It would then have to agree to monitor the use of these
funds controlled by Israel to maintain Palestinian political stability to
achieve Israeli aims of security without knowing in advance the nature of
the Palestinian state that Israel would eventually allow. A constituency with
such a sympathetic understanding of the security concerns of the occupying
power is unlikely to have been broadly enough based in Palestine to have
allowed a democratic government to be constructed that could openly carry
out the necessary regulation of these political transfers. Moreover, as we
have argued earlier, the possibility of open democratic transfers assumes
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that fiscal resources are sufficient to satisfy enough demands legitimately to
maintain stability. It is unlikely that Palestinian fiscal capacity, even with a
full transfer of tax-collecting powers to the PNA, would have been sufficient
to achieve stability through generalized transfers given the widespread
economic deprivation and political dissatisfaction with the terms of the two-
state solution. This fiscal constraint is an important imperative driving
patron–client politics in developing countries. By definition, patron–client
politics involves secret transfers to critical groups rather than open transfers
to all deserving groups. These considerations warn us not to be overly opti-
mistic that democratization of control over tax revenues would be sufficient
to achieve the allocation of resources required in conflict and transforma-
tion contexts.
If it was not the intention of the Oslo Agreements to immediately create a
liberal-democratic state in Palestine, it makes little sense to criticize the PNA
leadership for not delivering a satisfactory democracy before the ‘peace
process’ had delivered a state. In addition, even in a more typical developing
country where a sovereign state already exists, it is not clear that a demo-
cratic state can be entrenched without addressing the problem of how to
create a viable and dynamic economy. If we reject the simplistic good gover-
nance or neo-patrimonial models, rapid democratization would not in itself
have addressed the problem of social and economic transformation, without
which the conditions for sustaining democracy and making it viable would
not have been attained.
Clearly, progress in democratization under the PNA was too slow. But
how is progress to be accelerated? Here there is room for genuine disagree-
ments about the extent to which the pace of democratization was held back
by a lack of ‘democratic will’ on the part of the Palestinian leadership, as
opposed to structural constraints, in particular the institutional and
economic arrangements underpinning the peace process. In Chapter 2 by
Hilal and Khan, we argue that economic development and political stabi-
lization were primarily constrained by the nature of the institutions set up
by the Olso agreements and by the external strategies and constraints
imposed by Israel. In turn, this made progress in democratization very diffi-
cult to sustain. Given these internal and external constraints, far from the
concentration of executive power being dysfunctional, centralization
arguably maintained the viability of the PNA, by allowing the executive to
create rents and transfers that stabilized the economy and polity in very
difficult circumstances. It is likely that a weaker executive would have led to
an earlier collapse of the PNA due to its inability to maintain even limited
stability and security.
In the aftermath of the Second Intifada, the US-sponsored Road Map
demanded a decentralization of power within the Palestinian Authority and
the creation of checks and balances on the powers of the executive as a
precondition of further progress. It is not clear why checking the executive
will necessarily deliver democracy that is more meaningful for the
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Palestinian people. Moreover, it is far from clear that a weaker executive will
be able to manage rent-allocation for economic and political stabilization
even to the extent of the previous administration. While the Palestinian
public was dissatisfied with the degree of democracy that it enjoyed, and
progress towards statehood was indeed stalled, it does not follow that the
weakness of democracy was the cause of the stalled peace process.
Correlation does not establish causation. Democracy in Palestine, as else-
where in the developing world, is an end in itself. Democracy of any
particular type does not necessarily play a functional role in terms of
promoting the viability of transformation economies or reaching territorial
compromises with a colonial power. Rather, democracy needs to be
entrenched by ensuring rapid economic growth and the construction of a
viable polity. Over the longer term, the democratic aspirations of the
Palestinian people were more likely to have been furthered by strengthening
the capacity of the Palestinian quasi-state to manage developmental strate-
gies in the context of a viable state. Indeed a full-blooded Palestinian
democracy may have made the ‘security-first’ route to statehood much more
difficult if not impossible. Since this was self-evident to Israel in 1994, one
can question why Israel and its external allies have put so much emphasis on
the ‘democratization’ of the PNA after 2000. It is possible that Israel began
to believe that a divided and weak Palestinian leadership would be easier to
negotiate with. But if the Palestinian executive were actually to be weak-
ened, this would be a Pyrrhic victory for the Israelis. A Palestinian
leadership that was weak enough to accept impossible Israeli terms is likely
to be too weak to impose any such ‘solution’ on its unwilling population.
Four routes of state formation
The rents observed in the Palestinian economy suggest that the effects and
implications of externally controlled rents dominated the operation of the
quasi-state. We described such a state as a client state. At the same time,
other rents observed in the Palestinian context suggested a number of
different state characteristics that existed in incipient form in the PNA.
Some of the observed rents were compatible with aspects of a predatory
state, others with a fragmented clientelist state, and others with a develop-
mental state. If the client state was an interim rather than a permanent
phenomenon, the PNA could have progressed along one of these possible
routes, depending on which rents and rent-management capacities became
more dominant over time. Table 1.2 lists the rents and rent-management
features that are consistent with each of these state types, and summarizes
the evidence discussed so far.
In the rest of this section, we discuss the client state and its two variants –
the integrationist and asymmetric containment client states. Since these vari-
ants have very different implications for Palestinian state viability, and
therefore for internal governance improvements, we discuss the viability of
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these state types at length. We also discuss Israel’s possible strategic calcula-
tions in wanting a client state, and eventually a particular variant of a client
state in Palestine. These strategic concerns are important for assessing the
feasibility of the state formation process as a whole. We then discuss the
incipient predatory, fragmented clientelist and developmental characteristics
of the quasi-state, and the significance of these observations.
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Table 1.2: Rents, rent-seeking and state characteristics in the Palestinian context  
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As we have already observed, the rents transferred by external powers to
ensure political compliance by the PNA played an important role in the
security-first route to Palestinian statehood. If these externally controlled
rents had institutionalized into a long-term arrangement for determining the
economic and social policy of the Palestinian state, this would amount to a
consolidation of a Palestinian client state. The client-state outcome is
specific to the Palestinian state-formation experience, and the conditions
underpinning it flow from the peculiar security concerns of Israel. Since
Israel believed that it was unlikely that a sovereign Palestinian state would
put the security of Israel at the top of its agenda, it insisted on controlling a
range of rents that were critical for the survival of the emerging Palestinian
state. The Oslo Agreements institutionalized the dependence of the PNA on
rent flows controlled by Israel and the donors during the interim period (see
Chapter 3 by Zagha and Zomlot as well as Chapter 2 by Hilal and Khan).
Many of the Palestinian critics of the PNA identified the way in which Israel
sought to control rents that were critical for the Palestinian economy, and
the way in which the PNA appeared to acquiesce to this control, as evidence
of an operating or emerging client state. In the eyes of these critics, the
donor community contributed to the construction of a client state by also
making aid to the PNA conditional on Palestinian participation in a peace
process that gave priority to Israel’s security requirements. Although neither
side would describe these arrangements as a ‘client state’, we will use this
term to describe the external rent-control aspects of the Oslo Agreement.
The facts of externally controlled transfers and other mechanisms of control
are not in dispute (see Chapter 3 by Zagha and Zomlot, and Chapter 6 by
Fjeldstad and Zagha). The question is only about the effects of this depen-
dence, and whether these were transitional or permanent characteristics of
the emerging state.
Transfers from an outside power can only ensure compliance by a client
in conjunction with other policies. Compliance can in theory be induced by
two quite different strategies. At one extreme, transfers could be linked to
the implementation of policies that achieved the goals of the dominant
power but which were greatly beneficial for the client as well. Some
constituencies in the client state may resist these policies in the short run,
and conditional rent-transfers from the dominant power could assist the
implementation of mutually beneficial policies by creating immediate incen-
tives for compliance. Once these policies were in place, external control of
rents would no longer be necessary because co-existence would be mutually
beneficial and there would be endogenous incentives for compliance on both
sides. At the other extreme, if the goals of the dominant power could not be
achieved through policies that benefited the client, transfers combined with
policies that maintained the vulnerability of the client could ensure compli-
ance. If the economy of the client were vulnerable, the threat to withdraw
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transfers and to otherwise damage the economy of the client would threaten
regime survival and would therefore ensure compliance. In principle, each of
these polar strategies could ensure that the external control of transfers and
other control powers would have the effect of ensuring compliance, but with
very different consequences for the client. The economic and political impli-
cations of a client state consolidating in Palestine would therefore depend
critically on where Israeli strategies were located along this spectrum.
The best client-state scenario (from the Palestinian perspective) would
clearly be one where Israel attempted to ensure compliance through policies
that over time created endogenous incentives for compliance. The most
obvious policy of this type in the Israel–Palestine context would be an
Israeli push for the full integration of the two economies. Such an integra-
tionist strategy would involve a rapid, or at least a steady increase in
investment and capital flows from Israel into the Palestinian territories and
an equivalent reduction of restrictions on the movements of labour of all
skill categories in the other direction. From a Palestinian perspective, while
integration is not necessarily the best strategy for ensuring the rapid develop-
ment of the Palestinian economy, it is a reasonably attractive one. It is not
the best because integration may slow down the development of a
Palestinian national capitalism. Nevertheless, the Palestinian economy
would clearly benefit from freer access to the labour and capital markets of
the more advanced Israeli economy. It would allow accelerated capitalist
development in the Palestinian territories, but one that would be dominated
by Israeli capitalists for a very considerable time. Moreover, given the long
history of conflict, economic development alone may not have satisfied
Palestinian demands for justice and redress. Occasional acts of violence on
both sides could be expected. Nevertheless, as integration deepened, a
Palestinian client state would have neither the interest nor the ability to chal-
lenge Israeli interests, and eventually control of its fiscal resources would no
longer be necessary. Thus while the long-term success of an integrationist
strategy was not guaranteed, it had a good chance of success. But a
minimum precondition for its success was that the Palestinian quasi-state
should be able to offer rapid economic development for broad sections of its
population, and to demonstrate to its people that prosperity depended on
compliance with the security priorities of Israel. An integrationist client-state
strategy might have satisfied these conditions.
Although some Israeli policy statements suggested that the Israeli
strategy was indeed one of constructing an integrationist client state (see for
instance, Peres 1993), in fact moves towards economic integration were at
best halting. We argue (Chapter 2 by Hilal and Khan, and Chapter 3 by
Zagha and Zomlot) that contrary to expectations, Israel rapidly strength-
ened the mechanisms of control that existed before Oslo, and introduced
new mechanisms of control deep inside the Palestinian territories that signif-
icantly increased the vulnerability of the Palestinian economy. The failure to
deepen integration and indeed its reversal in many respects cannot be
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explained by security threats because the reversal began at the very outset, at
a time when there was widespread support for the Oslo route on both sides.
However, it is possible to make sense of Israel’s retreat from this route if we
remember that along with security, Israel had another fundamental objec-
tive, and that was to maintain its identity as a Zionist state. As the European
Union (EU) model shows, in the long run the political separation of closely
integrated economies makes less and less sense. It may have been the fear
that ever closer economic integration may in a distant future lead to political
integration that ruled out strong support for an integrationist strategy in
Israel (see DellaPergola 2001 for an analysis of the demographic data and its
implications for the viability of Israel).
If the integrationist approach failed to make progress for this or for any
other reason, leverage over a Palestinian client state would have to be main-
tained by other means. The worst scenario of a client state from a
Palestinian perspective would be one where Israel did not allow economic
integration, but attempted to create an economic context where the suspen-
sion of transfers would amount to a severe penalty for non-compliance.
Instead of integration, an Israeli capacity to periodically close down move-
ments of labour and goods in large parts of the Palestinian economy would
also ensure that Israeli control over PNA rent transfers would provide signif-
icant leverage over the client state. But to do this without also hurting the
Israeli economy, integration would have to be highly selective to maximize
the asymmetric impact of closures. We describe this as a strategy of asym-
metric containment. By ensuring that the Palestinian economy could be hurt
in an asymmetric way by Israeli decisions, the Israeli state ensured that the
Palestinian economy remained in a state of sustained vulnerability. A
suspension of transfers would then greatly magnify Israel’s economic and
political influence. Arguably, compliance would follow. Indeed, following
this strategy, if the Palestinian economy were to become more self-sufficient,
the threat of rent-withdrawal would work less well for ensuring compliance.
Many aspects of Israeli policy during this period are consistent with a
strategy of asymmetric containment. Even before the Oslo Agreements, only
unskilled Palestinians could find employment in Israel, and they could be
excluded at short notice without significant cost to the Israeli economy. This
did not change after Oslo, contrary to the requirements of deepening economic
integration. On the contrary, the Palestinian labour market became much more
vulnerable. Israel rapidly institutionalized what began as a temporary system of
checkpoints and prohibited areas. This allowed it to disrupt movements of
goods and people within the Palestinian territories, and potentially to isolate
Palestinians within particular villages and towns. In addition to formalizing
and deepening existing methods of control, Israel established extensive controls
over Palestinian trade and diplomatic relationships with the outside world as
part of the Oslo Agreements. This made Palestinian consumers and producers
much more vulnerable than if they had been purchasing imported products
directly from Israelis, as they had been before Oslo.
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The effects of this system of control assisted in the ‘de-development’ of
the Palestinian economy (Roy 2001). Our notion of asymmetric contain-
ment suggests that de-development may have been to some extent an
intended consequence of Israeli policies. Palestinian economic vulnerability
ensured that control over critical Palestinian rents gave Israel greater
leverage to ensure compliance in security and other issues. To make matters
worse for the Palestinians, it would be much more difficult to guarantee
Israeli security with asymmetric containment since Palestinians would now
face much greater hardships. Compared to an integrationist client state, a
client state that accepted containment would have to use much greater
repression on its own people. In our assessment (Hilal and Khan, Zagha and
Zomlot, this volume), Israeli strategies on the ground were closer to the
asymmetric containment end of possible compliance strategies. There were
some investments in Palestinian territories by Israelis over this period (for
instance in the Jericho casino and in some indirect shareholdings), but
significantly, there was no loosening of restrictions on labour movements. In
fact, controls over labour movements became much more restrictive during
this period, as did controls over movements of goods. The degree of restric-
tion has to be measured not just by looking at the aggregate movements of
labour and goods, but by looking at the system of control that allowed Israel
to stop movements on a daily basis inside the Palestinian territories, as well
as to and from the outside world.
While the Palestinian leadership clearly accepted some version of a client
state as the only deal on offer in the interim period, for their own survival they
refused to accept a client state based on asymmetric containment as a long-
term possibility. However, it soon became apparent that this was the only client
state that was on offer in the interim period and beyond, creating profound
obstacles for the Oslo road-map. Many of the conflicts between the Palestinian
leadership and the Israelis during the Oslo period, and particularly towards the
end of this period, reveal a growing tension between Israeli attempts to enforce
a system of compliance based on asymmetric containment and Palestinian
attempts to break out by following independent developmental strategies.
Israeli objectives and the feasibility of its client-state strategy
A number of deeper questions are raised by these observations. It is easy to
explain why Israel wanted and still wants a two-state solution. The demo-
graphic balance has already shifted to the point that a Zionist state in
historic Palestine (that is 1948 Israel and the occupied territories) is no
longer viable. But why did Israel want to have a client state in the occupied
territories that would now become the truncated state of Palestine? And why
did it then impose asymmetric containment on it? These are fundamental
questions with enormous implications for the future viability of a
Palestinian state. After all, Israel could simply have withdrawn to the inter-
nationally recognized 1967 borders and allowed full sovereignty to the new
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state. We can only reflect on a number of possible answers to these questions
since fully satisfactory answers would require a separate project on Israeli
political economy. The simplest but least plausible possibility is that Israel
felt threatened by a fully sovereign Palestinian state if it simply withdrew to
its 1948 borders, and it therefore needed to have security guarantees by
retaining controls over the foreign and defence policies of the new state. This
may appear to be plausible but it is actually extremely unlikely that Israel
had anything to fear militarily from the fledgling Palestinian state.
A more plausible possibility is that powerful groups in Israel would not
give up the large number of settlements (with roughly a quarter of a million
settlers) in the Palestinian territories that they saw as Jewish territories by
divine right. If so, full separation would not be feasible and Israeli security
would now definitely require a client Palestinian state. Palestinians would
have to accept a number of non-contiguous territories as a ‘state’ and they
would have to accept a permanent Israeli presence in strategic and economi-
cally valuable locations within their ‘state’, such as settlements sitting atop
all the critical water sources. In such a context, Palestinian security coopera-
tion would be required on an ongoing basis to protect the settlements (Judt
2003). This is plausible, but if the survival of Zionism behind 1948 borders
only required action against the settlers, we would have expected to see
greater efforts, at least by Labour, to prepare the grounds for removing
them. But instead of any concerted attempts to withdraw settlements, both
Labour and Likud built new settlements and expanded existing ones after
the signing of the Oslo Agreements. So, if the impossibility of withdrawing
settlements drove Israel to a client-state strategy, it was not because the
establishment that signed the Oslo Agreements discovered that it could not
get rid of the settlers, but rather it appeared that it did not even intend to
remove them.
This suggests a third possibility that the problem facing the Israeli state
may have been even more intractable than that of removing the settlers. The
actions of both Labour and Likud suggest that a broad swathe of the Israeli
political class did not see the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state as a
solution to the ‘Palestinian problem’. A possible explanation of such an atti-
tude could be that the Israeli political class could see that even after the
creation of a Palestinian state, a significant Palestinian minority would
remain in Israel with Israeli citizenship. This Israeli Palestinian minority was
already around 20 per cent of the Israeli population at the time of the Oslo
Agreements, and its faster growth was expected to steadily increase this per
centage in the decades ahead. There was also the issue of the refugees. Many
of them were unlikely to give up their historic struggle to gain the right of
return, irrespective of any agreements signed by their leaders. This can
explain why the Israeli political class may have felt that Israel as a Zionist
state would always have to live with a ‘Palestinian problem’, and the exercise
of power over the Palestinians was going to be a permanent part of Israel’s
survival strategy as it had always been in the past (see for instance, Shlaim
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2000). If so, it would make perfect sense to concede at best a client
Palestinian state that may in the future assist in the ongoing management of
the bigger problem.
If a client state for the Palestinians made sense for Israel, why did it
also want to impose asymmetric containment on this state? The answer to
this would depend on why we think Israel wanted a client state in the first
place. If the client-state strategy had been driven primarily by security
fears, and the need to have some degree of influence over security expen-
ditures and security arrangements in the Palestinian state, a client state
with integration would be eminently feasible. Indeed, the relatively low
level of violence in the period immediately following Oslo suggests that
security cooperation between the two sides was initially quite good.
Moreover, remarkable optimism and calm on both sides characterized the
immediate post-Oslo period. Clearly, the problem was not the policing
capacity or even the determination of the quasi-state to deliver security. If
integration could rapidly increase the incentives to comply, why was the
integrationist strategy not more forcefully pursued, and why did asym-
metric containment increasingly become the dominant strategy? To find a
plausible explanation we have to remember that Israel was not just
concerned about security, but security and demography. If the possibility
of sharing sovereignty with a non-Jewish majority in any form and at any
time, even in the distant future, is ruled out, so is economic integration,
since the latter is likely to lead in the end to some forms of political inte-
gration. Thus even if the initial concern was purely one of security
(whether security within 1948 borders or security for the intractable
settlers as well) demographic concerns would still rule out an integra-
tionist strategy. If the initial concern was one of security and keeping all
options open regarding a much bigger demographic challenge that
included Palestinians within Israel and the refugees, then integration was
even more forcefully ruled out, even though a client state would still be
desperately required. While a number of factors were clearly jointly at
play, this complex set of options may help to explain why Israel wanted
to achieve both a client state and one that was based on asymmetric
containment.
What was amazing about the historical opportunity that was opened up
by Oslo was that on the Palestinian side, the Palestinian leadership accepted
the necessity of at least a temporary form of ‘client’ status for the emerging
Palestinian state (defined as external control over critical rents and deci-
sions). It was clear to the Palestinian leadership that at best what was on
offer as the outcome of the Oslo Agreements was not only a territorial
compromise from the perspective of historic Palestine, but also an accep-
tance of an Israeli veto over many important decisions of their ‘state’, which
would therefore be less than sovereign. For instance, it was clear that any
future Palestinian state would have limited military and foreign policy free-
doms compared to other states and cooperation with Israel on security was
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not going to be optional at least in the immediate future. By signing the Oslo
Agreements, Arafat and his leadership implicitly accepted these limits.
Perhaps surprisingly, there was initially strong internal support for a
compromise along these lines within the WBG Palestinians, and this
provided Arafat with his political constituency.
Nevertheless, within these limits, Arafat and his constituency had some
clearly defined minimum requirements. Some of these requirements are
well known and were articulated during the Camp David talks on the
final settlement. On the issue of territory, it was clear that after relin-
quishing the 78 per cent of Palestine on which Israel had been established
in 1948, the Palestinian state would have to include all of the territory
occupied in 1967 (including East Jerusalem), with minor border adjust-
ments on the basis of exchanging territory where necessary. On the issue
of the refugees, the PNA knew that no solution would work if Israel did
not admit that ethnic cleansing took place in 1948. It followed that Israel
had to recognize in some form the right of return that is enshrined in
international law, but with flexibility in its implementation. What is crit-
ical is that while Arafat demanded ‘true independence and full
sovereignty: the right to control our own airspace, water resources, and
borders; to develop our economy; to have normal commercial relations
with our neighbours, and to travel freely’3, these demands were not articu-
lated to include military and foreign policy independence, or to exclude
security cooperation. In other words, the PNA deferred to Israeli security
concerns in ways that de facto amounted to reduced sovereignty during
the interim period and beyond.
The compromise that Arafat and his constituency were willing to make
was to accept a state that had all the trappings of sovereignty but which
allowed Israel to have a say in all matters that could be related to security.
Such a state clearly would not have full sovereignty in all respects. But this
compromise on sovereignty could only remain politically viable if the
emerging state could provide the PNA’s internal constituency with substantial
new economic opportunities. The rents that Israel and the donors controlled
could have assisted in attaining these economic and political objectives
provided Israeli policies allowed rapidly expanding economic opportuni-
ties for all sections of the Palestinian people, including skilled
professionals, Palestinian capitalists as well as unskilled workers. In theory,
an integrationist strategy may have allowed this. However, as the strategy
of asymmetric containment became clearer, the aspirations of both sides
became increasingly inconsistent. The PNA’s political viability was directly
affected because its leadership had to generate growth through special
privileges for expatriate investors that alienated important sections of its
own population, and at the same time, the degree of ‘policing’ required to
maintain a client state with asymmetric containment proved to be ever
increasing in its required severity. These considerations have enormous
significance for Palestinian state formation strategies of the future. If an
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integrationist client state is not possible for the Israelis, and an asymmetric
containment state for the Palestinians, then a client state is effectively ruled
out. The question then becomes whether Israel can ever concede a fully
sovereign Palestinian state on 1967 borders even though this does not solve
its bigger ‘Palestinian problem’, and may even shrink a number of options
in dealing with other aspects of the ‘problem’. If not, the Oslo experience
tells us that the two-state solution is not likely to proceed much further.
Predatory state characteristics
We have seen that there was evidence of some amount of extortion by PNA
officials and of many damaging monopoly rents. For instance, the
monopoly rents created by setting up trading monopolies, or the alleged
extraction of tax resources into secret accounts controlled by the leadership
could easily have become predatory rents. There was also evidence of lower-
level extortion by PNA security staff from small businesses and others.
Rents are predatory if leaders extract resources from society, and the extrac-
tion leaves society worse off than it would otherwise have been. The latter
qualification is important because in our definition predation is not deter-
mined by the legality of the resource extraction but its economic effects.
Resource extraction by the state happens in all states. In developed countries
most of the resource extraction is legal in the form of taxes, but in devel-
oping countries, a greater part comes from grey activities or is illegal. To
judge whether rent extraction in any context is predatory, we focus on the
damage done to society, compared to viable alternatives where these rents
could be avoided or allocated in a better way. When we look at many of the
apparently predatory PNA rents from this perspective, only the examples of
direct extortions from businesses are unequivocally predatory rents. Some of
the Palestinian trading monopolies could have been beneficial for the
Palestinian economy compared to the alternative of not having them, given
the specific context of Israeli monopolies and Israeli control over external
borders. Similarly, some of the kickbacks going into secret or special
accounts may have been necessitated by the imperative of maintaining secu-
rity and flexibility in a context of fiscal control by the colonial power. At the
same time, some of these resources could easily be misappropriated and
used to enrich the leadership at the expense of society given what could be
achieved under these constraints. The judgement of when rents in a difficult
transformation and conflict context become predatory is therefore a difficult
one, and one over which there can be genuine disagreement.
Fragmented clientelist state characteristics
Redistributive transfers, as well as the creation of monopolies for powerful
faction leaders would also be consistent with aspects of an emerging frag-
mented clientelist state, but only if we can also find evidence that the
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recipient factions had the power to veto attempts at rent re-allocation by the
state. The qualification is important since all states have to create some
redistributive rents to maintain political stability. The PNA too was clearly
distributing rent to critical client factions during this period. For instance,
there was a rapid growth in employment in the state sector as thousands of
individuals were absorbed into administrative jobs, particularly in the
various security services. When public sector jobs are created without any
proportionate service delivery purpose, these jobs primarily deliver rents to
those who are employed. Was this simply political stabilization or was there
evidence that powerful Palestinian factions had sufficient power to demand
rent allocations of a type and extent that they themselves determined? In
our next chapter by Hilal and Khan, we examine these possibilities and find
very little evidence over this period that client factions could veto rent-
re-allocations in Palestine.
Developmental state characteristics
Some of the rents created by the Palestinian state had potentially positive
effects for economic development and political stabilization. The conditions
and capacities required for a developmental state need to be carefully identi-
fied because the range of rents such a state creates can be superficially
similar to those created by predatory or fragmented clientelist states. For
instance, a developmental state could create temporary monopoly rents, but
in this case, it would be to attract investment and encourage risk-taking, and
these rents would be managed to achieve these goals. A developmental state
could also create transfers and redistributive rents to accelerate the emer-
gence of capitalists and to maintain political stability, but these transfers
would be managed so that their efficiency costs were controlled, and the net
effect was an acceleration of developmental transformations.
To test if rent-management in the Palestinian context displayed any devel-
opmental state characteristics, we should look for evidence of rent
allocations that maintained political stability and provided conditional
support to emerging capitalists. A developmental state would have to have a
much greater degree of sovereignty than was allowed to the PNA under the
Oslo Agreements. Nevertheless, although this is not widely recognized, there
were elements in the rent-allocation organized by the PNA that were consis-
tent with a nascent developmental state. The scale was inevitably small given
the powerful external constraints facing the state, and the short time period
before the first normal period of development ended in 2000. But there is
evidence that the PNA used rents to attract expatriate Palestinian capitalists
who had substantial investment funds and entrepreneurial experience. Many
did invest in Palestine under the PNA despite the extreme uncertainty
regarding the future of the Palestinian state formation experiment. The
PNA also displayed some ability to correct mistakes in the allocation of
rents, re-allocating rents to those who might be more efficient (and who
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could therefore offer bigger benefits to the PNA over time). The ability to
override factional interests and to correct misallocations of rents despite
factional opposition is a characteristic of developmental states that distin-
guishes them from fragmented clientelist ones, and enables them to ensure
that rents remain growth-promoting.
Since the rents and rent-management capacities underpinning all of our
incipient ‘state types’ could be found to some extent in the Palestinian terri-
tories under the PNA, our task is the more difficult one of identifying the
conditions under which each may have become more dominant. State failure
in our approach is explained not by the absence of conditions recognized as
good governance characteristics. Rather it is explained by the weakness of
conditions under which a developmental state with transformation capaci-
ties could have emerged, capable of dealing with the problems of
transformation in the Palestinian context. Conversely, conditions that
strengthened the possibility of one of the less dynamic types of state consol-
idating, in particular a predatory, fragmented clientelist or a client state
based on asymmetric containment would result in a decline in state viability
and possibly signal impending state failure.
A methodology for assessing state performance
The types of rents a state supports and its rent-management capacities
depend in turn on underlying institutional, political and other conditions.
The institutional structure of states is clearly important since this can
directly determine its rent-management capacities. The political context is
also critical, in particular because the distribution of power between groups
and classes can determine which groups are likely to succeed in getting the
rents that favour them. Other variables that are likely to play a role in deter-
mining the dominant types of rents include external conditions, particularly
in small states and states in conflict where rents may be controlled by
external powers. Initial conditions are also important, of which the most
important for our purposes is the prior degree of development of capitalism.
This may determine the types of rents that are feasible since some rents,
such as rents to accelerate technology acquisition, require a minimum level
of prior capitalist development. Figure 1.6 shows the four key sets of condi-
tions that we will look at in explaining the prevalence of different types of
rents and rent-management capacities.
First, the prior degree of development of capitalism and the organiza-
tional strength of capitalists are important variables determining
rent-outcomes. The relative power of different factions of capitalists and
their power relative to other social groups can determine the types of rents
that are created and how effectively the state can discipline and manage
these rents. Second, and related to this is the distribution of organizational
power in the broader society. The relative power of different groups and
classes can explain their ability to demand rents of different types. A third
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determinant of types of rents is the institutional structure of the state, and
this refers to both economic and political institutions. But instead of
presuming that democratic, decentralized or any other institutional structure
results in better rent-management capacities, our approach is to establish the
effects of a particular institutional structure, given the overall context defined
by other conditions. Thus, it is quite possible for democratic institutions, for
instance, to sometimes support value-enhancing rents, and at other times to
support value-reducing rents. Similarly, the effect of the centralization of
decision-making has to be examined in a specific context. At a general level,
all we can say is that the centralization of some critical state powers is
important for the functioning of any state. In particular the ability of the
central executive to coordinate the activities of different state agencies is
critical if developmental rents are to be created as opposed to redistributive
rents that only benefit particular groups. The leadership in a coordinated
state is less likely to benefit from damaging redistribution, because while
some constituents gain, others lose out, and the support base for the state is
not necessarily increased. In contrast, an institutionally fragmented state is
more likely to support damaging redistributive rents because each agency
can hope to benefit from redistribution to its constituents, without caring for
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Figure 1.6 Conditions determining rents and rent-seeking in social transformation
the loss of other constituents unconnected to it (Okuno-Fujiwara 1997;
Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Effective institutional centralization in turn
requires a corresponding distribution of political power that supports it
since the implementation of state decisions requires both institutional and
political capacities (Khan 1995). Finally, external conditions also have to be
taken seriously, particularly in the case of small countries and in conflict
situations. Indeed, in the Palestinian case, external conditions were of
paramount importance.
Each of these sets of conditions clearly keeps changing over time.
Moreover, growth or stagnation can itself feed back to change these condi-
tions, for instance by weakening or strengthening particular classes or by
allowing state capacity in particular areas to be improved, or constraining it
to collapse further. These feedbacks can in turn result in vicious or virtuous
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Figure 1.7 Policy sequencing in the good governance, neo-patrimonial and social
transformation approaches
cycles involving state capacity and economic performance. We can now
summarize the main differences in the policy implications of the good gover-
nance or neo-patrimonial approaches on the one hand, and our historical
approach on the other that aims to identify critical state capacities in a
comparative context. The left-hand column of Figure 1.7 shows the well-
known reform priorities of the good governance and neo-patrimonial
models, and the right-hand column contrasts these with our analysis based
on a comparative analysis of social transformation. The good governance
and neo-patrimonial approaches claim that democratization, anti-corrup-
tion strategies and liberalization are preconditions for development because
achieving them will ensure that economic growth takes off and political
viability is achieved. The economic growth that is supposed to follow then
ensures that these initial reforms are sustained and deepened. In contrast, we
argue that comparative history does not provide much evidence that devel-
oping countries became advanced capitalist countries by following such
strategies. Theory and evidence are at best weak and equivocal on the neces-
sity or sufficiency of these policies for accelerating growth. In the Palestinian
context, an uncritical application of good governance or neo-patrimonial
models can be doubly problematic in that it can divert the frustration with
the slow progress and relatively poor performance of state formation to
problems that while real, were not primarily responsible for the results.
The right-hand column in Figure 1.7 shows in contrast the policy impli-
cations of the social transformation approach described in this chapter.
Here the primary policy emphasis is to achieve the institutional, political
and external conditions that assist the creation and effective management
of developmental rents, including the rents necessary for maintaining polit-
ical stability; while reducing the rents that are damaging for growth and
rapid social transformation. If these necessary conditions for viable devel-
opment can be put in place, the next tier of policy priorities would be to try
and legalize the types of rent-seeking that support growth-enhancing rents
so that the corruption associated with these rents can be reduced, or
replaced with legal forms of rent-seeking. The historical evidence suggests
that satisfactory reductions in corruption are only likely to be achieved
once a broad-based capitalist class has developed that is no longer depen-
dent on primitive accumulation and can legitimately bargain over the
allocation of growth-enhancing rents. The growing prosperity of the
economy in turn allows sustainable extensions of democracy since more
and more of the rents required for political stabilization can be converted
into formal fiscal transfers.
If capitalist development and the deepening of political institutions take
place in parallel, the emerging capitalist system can become politically
entrenched through democracy. On the other hand, a failure of these second
tier reforms can mean that even high-growth emerging economies can face a
political crisis at some point. But since the Palestinian economy during our
period could hardly be described as having achieved the necessary conditions
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for viable economic development in the long term, focusing on the secondary
reforms necessary for politically entrenching a dynamic capitalist economy
would not necessarily ensure viability in this context. These reform priorities
can be particularly misleading if they take attention away from the funda-
mental constraints that prevented the construction of a viable Palestinian
state. Indeed, we have suggested that some of the apparent governance fail-
ures of the PNA were in fact rent-management strategies that attempted to
enhance the economic and political viability of the state in a context of
containment. If reform removed these capacities without addressing the
problems they were responding to, the emergence of a viable state may
become less likely. In the next chapter by Hilal and Khan, we use the method-
ology developed in this chapter to explore these possibilities.
Notes
1 Consolidated figures for aid flows to the Palestinian territories have not yet been
collated. Figures here are estimates based on a number of sources, World Bank
(2000) and (2001) and IMF (2003: 20–5).
2 PCBS, Press Release of Palestinian National Accounts for 1999, Ramallah, 2000.
3 See for example, the article by Yasser Arafat, ‘The Palestinian Vision of Peace’,
New York Times, 3 February 2002.
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